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Depreciation Damages in Eminent Domain
Proceedings
Kevin Duffy*
R ECENT TRENDS in constitutional law relating to criminal matters
have brought about a new awareness of the dilemma in which the
law finds itself when individual rights come into conflict with the state's.
The horns of this dilemma are familiar to anyone concerned with the
law of eminent domain. In fact, the reconciliation of public and private
interests is the heart of eminent domain law. Usually, the role of the
courts is to protect the individual property owner's rights in a given
situation, the supposition being that the government (or other ap-
propriating authority) is big enough to fend for itself. Such a role is
becoming increasingly important in this age of urban renewal, Interstate
Highway programs and other public projects which involve public acqui-
sition of private property.
As in the field of criminal procedure, the individual's right in emi-
nent domain proceedings are spelled out by the United States Constitu-
tion-specifically, Amendment V, which provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.' Of course,
the seeming simplicity of this constitutional provision belies the com-
plexities involved in its application. For example, it is well settled that
"just compensation" for a given piece of property must be measured in
terms of the fair market value of that property.2 But market values of
real estate are apt to fluctuate even under normal conditions, and their
behavior when a publi'c acquisition is in the offing can be chaotic.
For example, if the proposed public project will benefit an area
(e.g., urban renewal), property values are likely to increase. 3 On the
other hand, if the project will be a detriment to the area (e.g., a town
dump), values will decrease. 4 And when it is known that specific parcels
will definitely be taken for the project, a vicious circle effect takes place
in which the fair market value is based on the contemplated award,
which in turn is to be based on the fair market value.5 The problem the
*B.A., Ohio State Univ.; Second-year Student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
' U. S. Const., Amend. V.
2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 12.1 (6), (4th ed. 1962); and see illustrative cases in,
Oleck, Cases on Damages, 769-790 (1962).
3 Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain: Irreverence for Unconstitutional
Practice, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 319 at 327 (1963).
4 Jahr, Eminent Domain Valuation and Procedure 130, § 93 (1963).
5 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Providence County Courthouse Commission,
52 R.I. 186, 159 A. 642 (1932). Shreveport Traction Co. v. Svara, 133 La. 900, 63 So.
396 (1913). See Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain 450, § 105 (1953); Oleck,
Damages to Persons and Property 409 §§ 219-227 (1961 rev. ed.).
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courts face is in harnessing these economic forces in such a way that the
individual property owner's rights will be safeguarded. This note will
examine how the courts have dealt with depreciation in general, and de-
preciation when a "full taking" is involved in particular.
When Will Depreciation Be Compensated?
Naturally, the government cannot be expected to compensate own-
ers for the general depreciation of property values in the vicinity of a
public improvement.6 To do so would render the costs of said project
prohibitive. In order for a compensation award of any character to be
made, the land involved must be "taken" (which generally means that
the owner is substantially ousted from and deprived of all beneficial
use of the land affected) or damaged,s (which entails physical dis-
turbance of a public or private property right which gives the property
an additional value, and by reason of which disturbance the property
owner sustained a special damage in excess of that sustained by the
public generally).o
Once part of the property is taken or damaged, the door is open
for compensation for depreciation of the remainder. These are the so
called "partial taking" cases. There must be a definite physical rela-
tion between the part or right taken and the property which is de-
preciated, in order to allow damages for the latter. For example, if the
owner has two lots, A and B, lying on opposite sides of a road, and a
railroad bisects lot A, the owner may not be able to collect damages
for the injury done to B, even though A and B are integral parts of a
single farm enterprise. 10 Damages to the remainder in partial taking
cases are determined by one of three formulas: (1) They may be in-
cluded in assessing the value of the part taken; (2) The owner may be
awarded the value of the part taken plus damages to the remainder;
and, (3) He may be given the difference between the fair market value
before and after the taking." Of these three formulas, the second is the
one most often used.
The rule that some property right must be taken or damaged in
order to entitle the owner to any compensation produces some eyebrow-
6 Frazer v. Chicago, 186 Ill. 480, 57 N.E. 1055 (1900); State ex rel. Ohio Turnpike
Commission v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E. 2d 345 (1952), cert. den. sub nom.
Balduff v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 344 U.S. 865 (1952).
7 26 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, § 157; Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99
U.S. 635 (1878); Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 13 U.S. 166 (1871).
8 In 1870, Illinois amended the compensation provision of its Constitution to read,
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compen-
sation," Ill. Const., Art. 2, § 13. Several other states followed suit.
9 Alabama Power Co. v. Guntersville, 235 Ala. 136, 177 So. 332 (1937).
10 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain 229, § 47 (1953); Oakland v. Pacific Coast
Lumber, 171 Cal. 392, 153 P. 705 (1915).
11 Orgel, op. cit. supra note 10, pp. 226-236, § 47-51.
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol18/iss1/10
18 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
raising if not clearly inequitable results. For example, the construction
of a viaduct in a Texas city caused substantially the same depreciation
in value to two neighboring property owners. Owner A was compen-
sated and owner B was not. The rationale given was that owner A
was deprived of all reasonable access and owner B retained some access
even though B's access was impaired. 12
Full Takings: The Problem
Thus, when there is no taking, depreciation in value is damnum
absque injuria. When there is a partial taking, it is compensated. These
rules are fairly well settled. What is unsettled, however, is the problem
of depreciation when a full taking is involved. Stated simply, the prob-
lem is whether or not the law should compensate property owners for
the depreciation which is caused by the taking, but which occurs before
the taking. The problem is a direct result of two factors: One is a fact
of life and the other is a rule of law.
The fact of life is, as was mentioned above, that knowledge of im-
pending eminent domain proceedings can depress property values in an
area. Professor Donald W. Glaves calls this phenomenon "planning
blight." 13 It is caused by a variety of factors which will be examined
below.
The rule of law probably the most solidly entrenched in eminent
domain valuation (save the "fair market value" rule), is that damages to
the landowner are to be assessed as of the date of taking14 (or "date of
take" as it is called in Ohio).15 This rule arose from the necessity to
freeze fluctuating market values at a definite date. The rule is plagued,
however, by that age old legal paradox that hard and fast standards can
be at the same time necessary and futile.
The date of taking generally is defined as some stage of the legal
proceeding in which compensation is determined. In federal law, it is
the date at which a "declaration of taking" is filed by the government
and the estimated amount of compensation is deposited with the court.G
In other jurisdictions it may be the date of summons,17 date of a county
12 Adams, Diminution of Property Value is Compensable When a Property Owner
has been Deprived of All Right of Access for a Public Use, But the Same Diminu-
tion is Damnum Absque Injuria if Reasonable Access Remains, 4 Houston L. Rev.
120 (1966).
13 Glaves, op. cit. supra note 3 at 322.
14 Colaluca v. Ives, 150 Conn. 521 at 531, 191 A. 2d 340 (1963); In re Board of Water
Supply of City of New York, 227 N.Y. 452, 14 N.E. 2d 789 (1938); Barnes v. Peck, 283
Mass. 618, 187 N.E. 176 (1933).
15 Ohio jurists are said to distrust use of the gerund.
16 Declaration of Taking Act, Sec. 1-5, 40 U.S. Code Annot., Sec. 258a-258c.
17 Calif. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1243, 1249; Lansburg v. Market Street R. Co., 98 Cal.
App. 426, 220 P. 2d 423 (1950); Ariz. Code 1939, § 27-916.
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court order condemning the land,' s or date of the filing of eminent do-
main proceedings 19 or the date of trial.20
The date of taking can, however, be the date at which the govern-
ment enters into possession if this occurs prior to the statutory date.2t
Thus, there is usually a time lag between the time when the proposed
project begins affecting property values and the date of taking as de-
fined by law. If the property has depreciated, the owner may well be
left holding the bag, and the appropriator in the enviable position of
being able to deliberately delay the taking, and thus take advantage of
the depressed values.
Of course, the land may have appreciated during this time lag. In
such a case, the law is fairly well settled: The court must assess dam-
ages without regard to enhancement in value caused by the public
project.2 2 The recovery of such value would be an undeserved windfall
to the property owner. But a loss caused by depreciation is similarly
undeserved by the landowner. Why then is the rule for depreciation not
well settled consistently with the rule for appreciation?
The reason is that any appreciation in value caused by the public
project is likely to be economic rather than physical; that is, caused by
a general increase in demand in the area as opposed to actual physical
improvement of the property. If physical improvements are made, they
are likely to be made by the owner-not the appropriator or any third
person. The government is not in the habit of putting new roofs on
houses it intends to demolish. Depreciation, or planning blight, on the
other hand may be caused by a combination of economic and physical
factors. Demand for property in the area drops, and at the same time
tenants move out, vandals and vermin move in, and structures are al-
lowed to deteriorate.
With regard to purely economic depreciation, the courts have re-
fused to compensate, because to attempt to do so would "involve the
government in unfathomable speculation." 23 When physical deprecia-
tion is involved, however, the problem gets sticky. At first blush, the
solution seems simple: the depreciation was caused by the project, so
18 Ark. Stat. § 76-510, 76-917.
19 Fla. Stat. Annot., § 73.01.
20 19 Ohio Jur. 2d 535.
21 U.S. v. Anderson, 179 F. 2d 281 (5th Cir. 1950); Board of Education of Cleveland
City School District v. Hecht, 102 Ohio App. 521, appeal dism. 165 Ohio St. 200(1955); Application of Westchester County, 127 N.Y. Supp. 2d 24, 204 Misc. 1031(1953).
22 Kerr v. Park Commissioners, 117 U.S. 389 (1885); Shoemaker v. United States, 147
U.S. 282 (1893). A small minority holds the opposite view: see, Hard v.. HousingAuthority of the City of Atlanta, 219 Ga. 74, 132 S.E. 2d 25 (1963).
23 Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 13 Cal. App. 505,
57 P. 2d 575 (1936); U.S. v. Certain Lands in Town of Highlands, 47 F. Supp. 934(S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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the appropriator should compensate. The situation is complicated, how-
ever, by the fact that the actual acts which physically depreciated the
property may have been done not by the appropriator, but by vandals,
administrative agencies (other than the one doing the appropriating)
or even the owner himself. Thus, a problem of culpability, or "proximate
cause" as it would be called in tort law, arises.
Because of the above considerations, the law dealing with the prob-
lem of depreciation is unsettled. The courts have compensated in some
cases and refused to compensate in others.
Compensation Denied
In the cases in which compensation is denied, the courts have shown
their concern for the problem of culpability. Usually, the landowners in
these cases (1) ask for a date of valuation earlier than the date of
taking, and/or (2) ask the court to construe some act of the appropriator
which led to the depreciation as a "taking." With regard to (1), the
courts refuse to stray from the established rule. With regard to (2),
they may accept something less than an entry into possession as being
a "taking," but it must be some actual physical invasion by the ap-
propriator. In this way, the courts make sure that the appropriator does
not pay for something that someone else has done.
Thus, the Texas Supreme Court said in State v. Vaughn24 that:
The mere fact that tenants learn of contemplated condemnation and
because of such information elect to vacate property does not af-
ford the owner the right to receive damages from the state, since
there has been neither a taking nor any character of physical in-
vasion of the property.
The Illinois court went along with this decision when there was vandal-
ism as well as vacancy involved. 25
In In Re Elmwood Park Project,26 the city actually sent letters to
the tenants telling them to move out, filed lis pendens and permitted
intense building inspection and citations against the owner. The court
conceded that these actions constituted a taking, but pointed out that
lax police protection, and reduced refuse collections, street cleaning
and street repair would not constitute a taking absent proof of specific
directives by city officials for the purpose of reducing the value of the
properties.
Research Associates, Inc. v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency 27
presented another case of interference by the city, but in this case it was
24 319 S.W. 2d 349 (Tex. 1958) note 3. See also Northwestern Gas Transmission Co.
v. Erhorn, 145 Conn. 83, 139 A. 2d 53 (1961).
25 Chicago Housing Authority v. Lamar, 2 Ill. 2d 362, 172 N.E. 2d 790 (1961).
26 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W. 2d 896 (1965).
27 15 Conn. 137, 204 A.2d 833 (1964).
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not the appropriator (the Redevelopment Agency), but two other ad-
ministrative agencies who interfered. The building standards board
refused his application for a building permit to make repairs, and sub-
sequently the Board of Health condemned the building. The owner asked
for an earlier date of taking on the basis of a claimed "conspiracy" be-
tween these three agencies. The court ruled that no taking had occurred
and that the actions of the building board and the Board of Health were
legitimate exercises of police power. Once again the non-culpability
of the appropriator denied the owner recovery for depreciation.
Compensation Allowed
In the cases in which the property owner has been compensated,
the courts are not as concerned with proximate cause as they are with
the injustice the landowner will suffer if he is not compensated. They
do, however, share with cases of the opposite result the reverence for
the rule that damages are to be determined as of the date of taking. An
Arizona case serves to illustrate the strength of this rule: A statute was
passed changing the date of valuation from the date of issuance of the
summons to the date on which the resolution condemning the land is
passed,2s the theory being that the state could save money by not having
to compensate the owner for improvements made after the resolution
was passed. The statute was declared unconstitutional as violating the
provision that "no private property shall be taken-for public-use with-
out just compensation." 29 Subsequently, a landowner tried to enforce
the statute in order to be compensated for damage done by vandals after
the resolution date but before the issuance of the summons. He was
barred because of the unconstitutionality of the statute.30 The theory
developed by the cases which compensate the owner, however, in effect
abrogates the date of taking rule, so in reality, only lip service is paid to
it.
In 1907, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the problem
of depreciation in full taking cases. In In Re South Twelfth Street,31
the court ruled that the plotting of a street through a private owner's
land is not a taking, but recognized that when a plotting has taken
place, the owner has lost his right to build on the property, and this de-
preciates the value greatly. The court said:
The municipality, in the furtherance of public ends, having stripped
the land of nearly its entire value, now, when it seeks to accom-
plish its purposes in furtherance therewith, is to be allowed to
28 Ariz. Rev. Stat., § 18-155d.
29 Ariz. Rev. Stat., Const. Art. II, § 17; State of Arizona ex rel. Wiley v. Griggs, 89
Ariz. 70, 358 P. 2d 174 (1960).
30 Dong v. State ex rel. Wiley, 90 Ariz. 148, 367 P. 2d 202 (1961).
31 217 Pa. 362 at 366, 66 A. 568 (1907).
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acquire the land by paying a sum measured by the little value the
municipality has left in it. Such a result would be a travesty on
the constitutional provision which requires-just compensation to
be made for the property taken.
The Twelfth Street case is an early landmark in the development
of the theory of valuation most frequently used when depreciation is
compensated, namely, that the property shall be valued as of the date
of taking, but any depreciation which occurred because of the project
should be ignored.3 2 In 1921, in another Pennsylvania street plotting
case,33 the court articulated this doctrine: "The matter (is) worked out
practically in assessing the damages, by simply ignoring the detrimental
effect of the plotting and treating the value of the property as though
there had been no such harmful results."
In a few states, the statutes on eminent domain provide that dam-
ages for lands taken shall be fixed at the value thereof "before the
taking." 34 These statutes were enacted so that neither enhancement
nor depreciation in value attributable to the public project should be
considered in fixing valuation. A Massachusetts case pointed out that
"before the taking" in the statute should be construed to mean before
the beginning of the entire public work which necessitates the taking.3 5
The Massachusetts ruling illustrates that what the policy of de-
termining damages as of the date of taking without regard to deprecia-
tion caused by the project does, in effect, is to readjust the valuation
date to a time immediately before the beginning of the project. If the
courts would forget about paying homage to the date of taking valua-
tion rule, and base compensation awards on the value of the property
before the inception of the public project, a measure of consistency
might be brought to the law with regard to compensation of depreciation
damages.
In State Road Department v. Chicone,36 the Florida Supreme Court
reconciles the two rules by stating that compensation should be based
on the value of property as it would have been at the time of the taking
if it had not been subjected to the debilitating threat of condemnation.
This suggests that the date of taking basis for valuation should be kept
because it is only those effects on value that are due to the project that
should be disregarded. In any given case, however, the public project
32 See, 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain 1329 (3rd ed. 1909).
33 Herman v. North Pennsylvania R. Co., 270 Pa. 551, 113 A. 828 (1921).
34 Tharp v. Urban Renewal and Community Development Agency of City of Pa-
ducah, 319 S.W. 2d 453 (Ky. 1965); Nedrow v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.,
245 Iowa 763, 61 N.W. 2d 687 (1953).
35 Connor v. Metropolitan District Water Supply Commission, 314 Mass. 33, 49 N.E.
2d 593 (1943).
36 158 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1963).
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is probably the most significant, if not the only factor affecting the value
of the property.
Finally, the Arizona Supreme Court, in State v. Hollis,3 7 used the
rule of ignoring depreciation caused by the public project. Thus, the
court ended doing what the unconstitutional statute referred to above
had attempted to do.
The Ohio Decisions
The law in Ohio with regard compensation of depreciation in full
taking cases is as unsettled as it is in other jurisdictions. An analysis
of three recent decisions on the subject will serve to illustrate. (By way
of background, it should be noted that the statutory date of take in
Ohio is the date of the trial at which compensation is determined,38
subject to the usual exception that if the appropriator takes possession
prior thereto, the date of the taking of possession will be used for valu-
ation purposes).39
Cleveland v. Carcione,40 decided in 1963, compensated the owner
for "planning blight." The facts are as follows: In 1957, the city of
Cleveland passed a resolution to the effect that it intended to appropriate
property for the St. Vincent renewal project. During the next six years,
the city acquired and demolished properties in the immediate vicinity
of appellant Carcione's property, so that at the time of the trial, the
property was "standing in a vast desert." During this time, the County
Welfare Department persuaded the relief tenants living in the Carcione
property to move out, by threatening to stop their rental payments. The
Department also aided tenants in finding new housing. Consequently,
at the time of the trial, only three tenants remained and the gross in-
come of the property had declined from $8110.00 in 1957 to $565.00 in
1961. The building had been badly vandalized and stripped of all fix-
tures. Thus, elements of the Lamar case (vandalism), the Elmwood
Park case (notice to the tenants to move) and the Research Associates
case 4 ' (interference by an agency other than the appropriator) 42 are
found in this factual situation. The Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga
County (Cleveland) held that it was error for the trial court to instruct
the jury that the standard by which compensation must be measured
37 93 Ariz. 200, 379 P. 2d 750 at 753 (1963).
38 Ohio Rev. Code § 5519.01 et seq. See note 20 supra.
39 In re Appropriation for Highway Purposes, 167 Ohio St. 463, 150 N.E. 2d 30 (1958);
Nichols v. Cleveland, 104 Ohio St. 19, 135 N.E. 291 (1922); In re Appropriation for
Highway Purposes, 9 Ohio App. 471 (1954).
40 18 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E. 2d 52 (1963).
41 See notes 25-27 supra.
42 It should be noted, as bearing on the question of culpability, that not only was the
interfering agency in this case not the appropriator, it was not even an agency of
the same governmental unit.
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was the fair market value at the time of the trial. It laid down the rule
that when the value of a parcel of property has depreciated because
of the action of the condemning authority, the owner of such parcel is
entitled to the fair market value of the property immediately before the
condemning authority took active steps to carry out the work of the
project which to any extent depreciated the value of the property.4 3
The appellate court, however, left it unclear whether they intended to
disregard the date of take standard of valuation, or whether they merely
construed the "active steps" of the condemning authority to be a "taking"
within the rule.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in Director of Highways v. Olrich,44 ob-
viously believed that the Carcione case construed the condemning au-
thority's acts as a taking. The facts and the decision in the Olrich case
are virtually on all fours with those in the Research Associates case dis-
cussed above.4 5
In June of 1960, Olrich asked for and was refused a building permit,
because the property was to be taken for highway improvement pur-
poses. In October of that year, the Urban Renewal Director certified
the property for abatement. In 1963, the highway department took pos-
session of the property. The date of take was set by the trial court as
the October, 1960 date when the property was condemned.
Substantial damage due to vandalism had occurred between 1960
and 1963. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court,
reaffirming the date of take standard for valuation, and ruling that an
order directing that the property be vacated as unfit for human habita-
tion is not a "taking." They distinguished the Carcione case on the
grounds that the condemnation in this case was a valid exercise of police
power, and there were no "active steps to carry out such project which
to any extent depreciated the property." In other words, the acts of the
appropriator were the remote, not the proximate cause, and therefore
the owner must bear the loss.
A recent case, Becos v. Masheter, Director of Highways,46 is prob-
ably the most confusing. In the Becos case, the main causes of the de-
preciation were vacancy and vandalism. (The vacancy was not due to
any direct interference on the part of the appropriator.) As a result of
these causes, the appellant Becos' once valuable duplex, which stood on
the property, had a fair market value of zero on the date of the trial.
The court ruled that a court may establish a "date of take for valuation
of the property taken which is reasonably related to such activity of the
appropriating authority" as caused depreciation of the property.
43 Carcione v. Cleveland supra note 40, at syllabus 1.
44 5 Ohio St. 2d 70, 213 N.E. 2d 823 (1966).
45 Supra note 27.
46 15 Ohio St. 2d 15 (1968).
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The confusion lies in the court's use of the phrase "date of take for
valuation." Did the court mean date of take? If so, it can be argued, as
it was by Justice Brown in the dissenting opinion,47 that there was not
a sufficient interference with the property (as there was in the Carcione
case) to amount to a taking. If, however, the court meant that in a case
in which there is depreciation the date of valuation should be moved
back to a time immediately before the inception of the project, without
regard to whether or not a taking has occurred, then a significant legal
breakthrough has taken place.
Justice Brown, by the dissent, shows that he feels that the court
used the phrase in the latter sense, because he argues that the majority
confused the concepts of date of valuation and elements of valuation.
He argues for the more common rule of retaining the date of take valua-
tion standard and ignoring any detrimental effects caused by the ap-
propriation. His argument for the position is the familiar one of proxi-
mate cause:
This holding-is unwise because it takes from the jury important
questions of fact concerning whether particular aspects of deprecia-
tion were or were not caused by acts of the condemner.
48
The theory behind a rule which would jettison the date of taking
standard in depreciation cases, however, is that the project itself is
really the "but for which" cause of the depreciation. Perhaps vandals,
not the appropriator did the damage, but there would be no vandalism
if there were no planning blight, and there would be no planning blight
if there were no project, therefore, the appropriator should compensate
for all such damage.
What is unclear, however is whether the Becos case stands for such
a rule. Only its future construction and application will tell.
What is needed is a decision, whether in Ohio or the other jurisdic-
tions, which more clearly articulates what the Becos case seems to say.
In this way, the constitutional guarantee of "just compensation" will be
served and the rights of the individual will be vindicated.
47 Id. at 19.
48 Id. at 21.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol18/iss1/10
